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Abstract
The euro zone crisis illustrates the insufficiency of adjustment mechanisms in a monetary
union characterized by a large heterogeneity. Exchange rate adjustments being impossible,
they are very few alternative mechanisms. This situation reflects a simple diagnosis. At the
level of the whole euro zone, the euro is close to its equilibrium parity. But the euro is strongly
overvalued for Southern European countries, France included, and largely undervalued for
Northern European countries, especially Germany. In a first step, the paper gives an evalua-
tion of these exchange rate misalignments inside the euro zone, using a FEER approach. Using
panel econometric techniques over the period 1994-2011, we confirm that the exchange rate
misalignments in the euro zone have diverged, reflecting unsustainable evolutions. Last, we
give an estimation of the equivalent transfers in % of GDP implied by these misalignments
in the different European countries. In a second step, we use a ‘stock-flow consistent’ model
of a monetary union with two countries along the lines of Godley and Lavoie (2007) and
Duwicquet and Mazier (2010). A federal budget is introduced with federal expenditures and
social transfers financed by federal taxes and euro-bonds issuing. Three results are obtained.
The stabilizing role of such a federal budget is confirmed facing asymmetric shock or the
negative impact of exchange rate misalignments inside the monetary union. Without such a
federal mechanism the overvaluation of the Southern currency (Greek or Spanish euro), fa-
cing the undervaluation of the Northern currency (German euro), induces a strong slowdown
in the South and a cumulative imbalances within the monetary union. Similarly, the stabili-
zing role of euro-bonds used to finance European investment projects is illustrated. Their
role in the pooling of national debts would be the last point to examine.
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1 Introduction
The euro zone crisis illustrates the insufficiency of adjustment mechanisms in a monetary union
characterized by a large heterogeneity. Adjustments mechanisms are defined in a broad sense
as mechanisms which permit a country after a shock to return to the initial situation or, pos-
sibly, to recover towards full employment after a slowdown. Exchange rate adjustments being
impossible, they are very few alternative mechanisms. Fiscal policy could play an active role
and in a federal state like the USA its stabilization coefficient is around 20% (Italianer and
Pisani-Ferry, 1992). But there is no equivalent in the European case. Well integrated capital
markets, with portfolio diversification and intra-zone credit, have been proposed as a powerful
adjustment mechanism by the ‘international risk sharing’ approach. Intra-zone credit and ca-
pital income from international portfolio would have stabilization coefficients around 20-30%
each (Asdrubali and Kim, 2004). These results have been used during the 2000 by advocates
of a liberal economic policy in the EU to promote deeper financial integration without hav-
ing to develop a federal budget (Commission européenne, 2007; Trichet, 2007). However, the
theoretical basis and the results appear highly questionable (Clévenot and Duwicquet, 2011).
Consequently, relative wage and price flexibility are proposed in order to take place, at least
partially, of exchange rate adjustments. Actually these mechanisms allow only a very slow
and partial return to equilibrium with an important cost in terms of growth and employment
and with large differences between countries, due to strong structural specificities. They are
more inefficient when they are implemented simultaneously in interdependent countries, as it
is presently the case in the euro zone, especially in the Southern European countries (Mazier
and Saglio, 2008). This situation reflects a simple diagnosis. At the level of the whole euro
zone current account is close to equilibrium and fiscal deficit is smaller than in many other
OECD countries. The euro is close to its equilibrium parity. But intra-European imbalances
are huge. The euro is strongly overvalued for Southern European countries, France included,
and largely undervalued for Northern European countries, especially Germany (Jeong et al.,
2010). These exchange rate misalignments block growth and induce fiscal and current deficits
in the South while growth is boosted in the North by exports, especially towards the rest of the
euro zone, and deficit are reduced. This situation is equivalent to implicit positive transfers
in favour on the North and negative transfers at the detriment of the South, which are largely
ignored in the public debate. The paper is organised as follow. In a first step, we give a new
evaluation of these exchange rate misalignments inside the euro zone, using a FEER approach,
and compare it with other estimations. Using panel econometric techniques over the period
1994-2010, we confirm that the exchange rate misalignments in the euro zone have diverged,
reflecting unsustainable evolutions. Last, we give an estimation of the equivalent transfers in
% of GDP implied by these misalignments in the different European countries. We compare
these results with the evaluation of the system of fiscal insurance proposed by the Commission
to fight asymmetric evolutions (Italianer and Pisani-Ferry, 1992). In a second step, we use a
‘stock-flow consistent’ model of a monetary union with two countries along the lines of Godley
and Lavoie (2007) and Duwicquet and Mazier (2010). The model describes the real sector and
assets and liabilities of all the agents in order to analyze financial integration in a consistent
manner. A federal budget is introduced with federal expenditures and social transfers financed
by federal taxes and euro-bonds issuing. Three results are obtained. The stabilizing role of such
a federal budget is confirmed facing asymmetric shock or exchange rate misalignments inside
the monetary union. Similarly, the stabilizing role of euro-bonds used to finance European in-
vestment projects is illustrated. Their role in the pooling of national debts would be the last
point to examine.
2
2 Intra-European exchange rates misalignments and implicit
transfers
2.1 Heterogeneity of misalignments within the euro area
Since the beginning of the 2000’s, we observe a surge of current account imbalances inside the
euro area in spite of a rather balanced current account for the whole area. On the one side,
Northern European countries have accumulated huge current account surpluses and on the
other side, Southern European countries have ran important current account deficit (see figure
1). These evolutions reflect, at least partially, increasing heterogeneity of exchange rate mis-
alignments (ERM, hereafter) inside the euro area. By using a FEER approach, introduced by
Williamson (1994), Jeong et al. (2010) show that Northern countries are increasingly underva-
lued and Southern countries are increasingly overvalued.
Figure 1: Current account imbalances as % of euro area GDP
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Notes: IMF WEO, April 2012. Current account balances are expressed in percentage of euro area GDP. Surplus
sample: Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Finland. Deficit sample: France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece.
Source: authors’calculations.
In this section, we estimate FEERs for ten European countries (Austria, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal and Greece) over the period 1994-2011. The
FEER is defined as the exchange rate prevailing when the economy simultaneously reaches the
external equilibrium and the internal equilibrium for all the trading partners. This measure
was derived from a standard world trade model in which all the variables are endogenous ex-
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cept the external equilibrium (sustainable current account determined by structural variables)
and the internal equilibrium (full utilization of the productive potential). The external equilib-
rium is estimated with panel regression techniques. The internal equilibrium is reached when
the output gap is closed1.
Table 1: Undervaluation (rc > 0) or overvaluation (rc < 0) for each ‘national euro’ in real
effective terms (in %)
rca EU AUT FIN FRA GER IRL ITA NLD PRT SPA GRC
1994 -3.4 -5.9 -4.6 0.3 -13.4 0.9 6.3 -2.1 6.7 3.8 16.8
1995 1.2 -5.8 9.7 3.9 -6.9 6.3 13.7 3.3 17.1 13.4 9.0
1996 4.2 -3.6 14.9 9.5 0.9 6.4 15.0 6.1 0.8 7.1 0.5
1997 3.5 -6.5 19.2 17.4 -1.0 2.8 10.5 4.0 -13.8 5.5 -5.0
1998 0.6 -3.0 18.0 15.9 -4.7 -0.2 5.6 -1.6 -19.7 0.5 -2.3
1999 2.0 0.3 20.7 22.7 -4.9 3.6 5.0 2.5 -25.0 -4.7 -8.6
2000 0.1 6.7 27.1 13.0 -2.8 3.4 5.0 1.9 -29.9 -7.4 -11.7
2001 6.9 8.6 34.3 19.6 8.6 6.6 10.9 5.6 -28.6 -4.6 -5.7
2002 6.6 19.9 33.1 12.4 13.5 3.9 5.9 1.9 -20.7 -5.1 -6.1
2003 2.2 8.8 17.9 2.9 8.1 -0.9 -1.0 3.0 -14.5 -9.8 -8.1
2004 6.6 9.7 21.4 1.6 17.8 1.3 6.8 7.8 -22.7 -16.1 3.5
2005 1.8 9.2 11.2 -7.0 17.3 -1.8 4.6 7.4 -36.1 -30.3 -5.1
2006 0.3 10.6 12.2 -7.4 19.3 -2.5 2.1 9.0 -37.3 -40.0 -20.9
2007 0.1 15.4 16.7 -9.0 23.6 -6.2 4.9 8.4 -31.5 -48.3 -31.4
2008 -2.6 20.3 12.0 -13.9 22.2 -7.6 1.9 7.8 -41.9 -48.8 -33.4
2009 0.6 12.2 4.4 -9.6 21.4 0.3 2.9 6.3 -30.8 -17.1 -20.7
2010 1.6 10.9 4.8 -11.8 21.8 7.6 -1.2 9.1 -25.1 -15.2 -18.5
2011 3.3 14.4 1.5 -13.0 23.1 7.0 3.1 11.5 -7.9 -5.5 -21.8
a Note: Forecasts for 2011 based on IMF WEO April 2012; See Jeong et al. (2010) for a complete description of the
model of world trade and the methodology used to compute ERM. Source: authors’ calculations.
Since the early 2000’s, we assist to a sharp increase of heterogeneity of misalignments in the
euro area (table 1 and figure 1). We can observe a split in the euro area between some coun-
tries increasingly undervalued (like Germany, Austria, Netherlands and Finland) and others
increasingly overvalued (like Greece, Portugal, Spain and France). On average since 2005, Ger-
many, Austria, Netherlands and Finland have been undervalued by 13% while Greece, Portugal,
Spain and France have been overvalued by 23%. This structural heterogeneity is at the heart of
current problems of the Euro.
Since 2008, we observe a reduction of misalignments for some Southern European countries
(Portugal, Ireland and, up to a certain point, Greece). These movements have been mainly
driven by large real effective devaluations in Ireland, Spain and Greece, as shown by the evolu-
tions of the unit labor cost (ULC) based real effective exchange rates in figure 2. These politics
of internal devaluation are very painful and had led to an acceleration of the crisis in Greece.
This important point will be discussed in the third part of this section.
1See Jeong et al. (2010). The methodology used is a synthesis of previous works on the FEER (Borowski and
Couharde, 2003; Jeong and Mazier, 2003) and of the Symmetric Matrix Inversion Method (SMIM) proposed by Cline
(2008).
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Figure 2: Real effective exchange rates relative to the euro area (unit labor costs based, 1999
= 100)
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Notes: European Commission’s Price and Cost Competitiveness database. Available at
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/competitiveness/documents/areea17.xls
2.2 Comparison with other estimates of ERM
Firstly, we compare our results with those of Cline and Williamson (2011). These authors use
a FEER approach based on the Symmetric Matrix Inversion Method (SMIM) methodology de-
scribed in Cline (2008). The main differences with our own FEER approach are, in the one hand,
a simpler treatment of foreign trade and, in the other hand, ad hoc current account targets.
More prosaically, in the case of the euro area countries of table 2, Cline and Williamson calcu-
late the needed change in the real effective exchange rate to reach a current account target in
2011 which stabilizes the Net International Investment Position of 2011. They, also, calculate
the needed change in the real effective exchange rate to reach a current account target of 3% of
GDP in absolute value in 2011. This standard assumption of imbalances of 3 percent of GDP
in absolute value was adopted in their precedent works.
On the whole, the results are largely similar Greece and Portugal exhibit large overvaluations.
Germany is more undervalued in our results mainly due to population aging. In our approach,
we estimate the equilibrium current account thanks to panel econometric techniques with some
explanatory variables like the dependency ratios. A larger part of dependent population re-
duces the national saving rate and so the equilibrium current account.
Secondly, we compare our own results obtained thanks to the FEER approach with misalign-
ments obtained by a BEER (Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate) approach (Coudert et al.,
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Table 2: Comparison with estimates of Cline and Williamson for 2011 (in%)
rc Germany Italy Spain Ireland Portugal Greece
2011a 23.1 3.1 -5.5 7.0 -7.9 -21.8
2011b 10.8 -11.2 -3.2 0.0 -22.0 -27.0
2011c 5.4 -2.0 -3.5 0.0 -20.7 -27.0
a Note: Our forecasts are based on the IMF’s WEO of April 2012.
b Forecasts of Cline and Williamson were based on the IMF’s WEO of April 2011 (Cline and Williamson, 2011). The
current account targets stabilize the Net International Investment Position of 2011.
c Note: Forecasts of Cline and Williamson were based on the IMF’s WEO of April 2011 (Cline and Williamson, 2011).
The current account targets follow the standard assumption of imbalances of 3 percent of GDP in absolute value.
2012). This approach, introduced by Clark and MacDonald (1998), consist to assess the im-
pact of long run determinants on the dynamics of the real exchange rate thanks to econometric
techniques. Many authors have selected parsimonious specifications with variables like the
net foreign assets and the relative productivity. An accumulation of foreign assets induces an
appreciation of the exchange rate and an increase of the productivity in the tradable sector re-
latively to the non-tradable implies an appreciation of the exchange rate (this variable captures
the well-known Balassa-Samuelson effect). After the estimation of a cointegration relationship,
the misalignments are given by the gap between the real effective exchange rate and the equi-
librium exchange rate (i.e. the product of the cointegration vector and the observed values of
the explanatory variables). In this approach, it is supposed that the real effective exchange rate
was at equilibrium on average over the period.
Table 3: Comparison with estimates Coudert et al. for 2010 (in %)
2010a 2010b
Euro area 1.6 -8.0
Austria 10.9 -3.2
Finland 4.8 7.3
France -11.8 0.4
Germany 21.8 0.5
Greece -18.5 -20.0
Ireland 7.6 -5.3
Italy -1.2 -6.6
Netherlands 9.1 -3.0
Portugal -25.1 -13.8
Spain -15.2 -10.0
a Our real effective misalignments obtained by a FEER approach.
b Real effective misalignments obtained by a BEER approach (Coudert et al., 2012)
As the BEER misalignments are, mainly, deviation from the average value of the real effective
exchange rates on the studied period, countries with higher inflations rates, in a monetary
union, will experienced higher real effective appreciation. If this appreciation has not stemmed
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from improvement in the net foreign assets or relative productivity, these countries will be
increasingly overvalued. On the contrary, the FEER misalignments are, mainly, deviation from
the average value of the current account on the studied period. In a monetary union, a widening
of the current account deficit will produce an increasing overvaluation.
In the BEER approach, France and Germany are close to equilibrium thanks to lower inflation
rates than in peripheral countries. In the FEER approach, France is increasingly overvalued
since the middle of the last decade (from 7 percent in 2005 to 13 percent in 2011) because
of persistent current account deficits. On the contrary, Germany is increasingly undervalued
(from 8 percent in 2003 to 23 percent in 2011) because of large current account surpluses even
during the crisis (around 6 percent of GDP since 2008). In our view, this divergence between
FEER and BEER approaches in the case of France and Germany reflects the fact that the FEER
take into account structural evolutions which are ignored with the BEER. Especially the decline
of the French structural competitiveness contrasts with the German improving performances,
as it is illustrated by the evolution of observed and equilibrium current accounts. The BEER
approach seems to be unsuited to describe structural problems of current account imbalances
in the euro area because of its temporal horizon (López-Villavicencio et al., 2012).
For peripheral countries, the results are more convergent. They indicate double-digits over-
valuations during the 2000’s. For Spain (overvalued by around 10 %), Portugal (overvalued
by around 15 %) and Greece (overvalued by around 20 %), the two measures of equilibrium
exchange rate are close because of current deficits which move away from their average values
and in reason of a strong real effective appreciation which deviates the real effective exchange
rates from their average value.
2.3 Divergence of ERM inside the euro area
In other approaches of equilibrium exchange rate like the Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange
Rate approach (BEER), the misalignments are necessarily stationary on the studied period. In
this approach, the misalignments are residuals from long run relationship between the real
effective exchange rates and its determinants thus the misalignment is stationary, by definition.
In the case of European countries during the period 1994-2010, the hypothesis of exchange
rates on average in equilibrium on the studied period (i.e. the misalignment is stationary)
seems to be unrealistic since these countries have experienced diverging path concerning their
competitiveness as evidenced by the evolution of current account imbalances (figure 1).
In the long run and at the world level, the FEERs and the REERs are integrated and cointe-
grated. In other words, the misalignments are stationary for a large panel of industrialized and
emerging countries on the period 1982-2007 to ensure external debt sustainability (Saadaoui,
2011). Nevertheless for European countries on the period 1994-2010, it seems improbable that
the misalignments have been stationary.
In a first step, we implement various panel unit root tests on the series of natural logarithms of
REERs2 and on the series of natural logarithms of FEERs. This step allows to determine if the
REERs and FEERs are non-stationary I(1) series. A series is I(1) if it achieves stationarity after
first differencing. As in previous empirical studies (Zhou, 1993; Barisone et al., 2006; Saadaoui,
2011), we detect the presence of unit roots in the series of real effective exchange rates (REERs)
and in the series of fundamental equilibrium exchange rates (FEERs).
As we can see, in table 4, the series of REERs and FEERs are non-stationary in level since we
accept the null hypothesis of the presence of unit root in all tests (except in the LLC test at the
2 Source: Bank for International Settlements for the real effective exchange rate basis 100 in 2000 (annual average
of monthly data).
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5 percent level for the feer series). Besides, the series of REERs and FEERs are stationary in first
difference since we reject the null hypothesis of the presence of unit root in all tests.
Table 4: Panel unit roots tests for REERs and FEERs
Testa LLC Breit. F_ADF F_PP LLC Breit. F_ADF F_PP
Difference No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exo. var. C, T C, T C, T C, T None None None None
Null Hyp. UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR
Common UR Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
reer 0.77 0.87 8.60 9.02 -1.90** -2.97*** 36.53** 49.38***
feer -1.75** -0.57 22.48 21.68 -6.07*** -2.95*** 49.32*** 84.14***
a Note: “UR” indicates the null hypothesis of the presence of unit root. The symbol ***, ** indicates statistical
stationarity at the 1 percent and 5 percent level, respectively. The table shows different panel unit root tests: Levin
et al. (2002) (LLC); Breitung (2000); Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) Fisher-type panel unit root tests
(F_ADF and F_PP). Source: authors’s calculations.
One limit of the previous tests is the assumption of cross section independence. This assump-
tion is, clearly, too restrictive for a panel of European countries which share the same currency.
In order to check the results, we implement the CADF test introduced by Pesaran (2007) which
allows for cross section dependencies (i.e. existence of common shocks) by subtracting cross
section averages of lagged levels in addition to the standard ADF equation, this test is robust to
cross section dependencies.
As we can see in table 5, the series of REERs and FEERs are non-stationary in level and station-
ary in first difference. We can conclude that the series are nonstationary I(1) series. After having
established this first result, the second step will consist to test if there is a long run relationship
between these two variables (i.e. the misalignment is stationary) during the studied period.
Table 5: Integration of REERs and FEERs
CADFa Level First Difference
reer -0.505 -5.211***
(0.307) (0.000)
feer 3.069 -2.755**
(0.999) (0.003)
a The p-values are in parentheses. The symbol ***, ** indicates statistical stationarity at the 1 percent and 5 percent
level, respectively. Source: authors’ calculations.
In order to test if there is a long run relationship between REERs and FEERs inside the euro
area, we can proceed in two distinct ways:
1. We can test the presence of unit root in the series of misalignments (i.e. the difference be-
tween the REERs and the FEERs). However, in this case, we made the implicit assumption
that the series are cointegrated with (1; -1) coefficient.
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2. Another way consists to test if there is a long run relationship between REERs and FEERs
by using panel cointegration tests (Pedroni, 1999). In this case, we made any assumption
on the value of the cointegrating vector.
If the misalignments are non-stationary or if we failed to detect a long run relationship between
REERs and FEERs, we can conclude that the ERM have diverged during the period 1994-2010.
As you can see in table 6, we accept the null hypothesis of presence of unit root in all tests
(except in the LLC test at the 5 percent level). As it is mentioned above, we check the robustness
of the results (to the hypothesis of cross section independence) by implementing the CADF test
(Pesaran, 2007). We can conclude that the series of misalignments are non-stationary (see table
7).
Table 6: Panel unit roots tests for misalignments
Testa LLC Breit. F_ADF F_PP
Difference No No No No
Exogenous variable Constant, Trend Constant, Trend Constant, Trend Constant, Trend
Null Hypothesis UR UR UR UR
Common UR Yes Yes No No
mis -2.25** 0.17 23.90 25.82
a Note: “UR” indicates the null hypothesis of the presence of unit root. The symbol ***, ** indicates statistical
stationarity at the 1 percent and 5 percent level, respectively. The table shows different panel unit root tests: Levin
et al. (2002) (LLC); Breitung (2000); Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) Fisher-type panel unit root tests
(F_ADF and F_PP). Source: authors’calculations.
Table 7: Integration of misalignments
CADFa Level
mis -0.023
(0.491)
a The p-value is in parentheses. Source: authors’ calculations.
The previous results indicate that ERM have diverged inside the euro area during the period
1994-2010. However, the previous tests made a strong assumption on the value of the cointe-
grating vector. In order to test the divergence without assumption on the value of the cointe-
grating vector, we implement Pedroni’s panel cointegration tests (1999).
In table 8, we accept the null hypothesis of no cointegration in most of test (except for the
panel ADF and the group ADF statistics at the 5 percent level). The results indicate, clearly,
a divergence on the studied period for these European countries. To ensure of the quality of
the results, we implement cointegration test which allows for cross section dependencies intro-
duced by Westerlund (2007). The existence of a negative and significant error correction term
is taken as proof for cointegration. In case of cross section dependencies between members of
the panel, critical values need to be obtained through bootstrapping.
9
The panel and group mean statistics suggested by Westerlund (2007) indicate clearly that the
null hypothesis of no cointegration is accepted even in presence of cross section dependencies
(see table 9).
Table 8: Panel cointegration tests
Pedroni residual cointegration tests
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration
Included observations 170
Cross-sections included 10
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefficients (within-dimension)
Panel-v -0.59 (0.72)
Panel-rho 0.37 (0.64)
Panel-PP -0.20 (0.42)
Panel-ADF -2.04 (0.02)
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefficients (between-dimension)
Group rho-Statistic 1.62 (0.94)
Group PP-Statistic 0.48 (0.68)
Group ADF-Statistic -2.13 (0.02)
a The p-value is in parentheses. Source: authors’ calculations.
Table 9: Cointegration of REERs and FEERs
Gτ Gα Pτ Pα
reer, feer -1.711 -4.551 -3.834 -3.277
(0.308) (0.530) (0.445) (0.466)
a P-values for cointegration tests are based on bootstrap methods, where 800 replications are used. See Persyn and
Westerlund (2008) for the details. Source: authors’ calculations.
Panel unit root tests and panel cointegration tests show that ERM inside the euro area have di-
verged during the 1994-2010 period. We failed to detect a long run relationship between REERs
and FEERs (i.e. the misalignment is non-stationary). This result indicates that European coun-
tries have experienced unsustainable evolution of their competitiveness during the period. This
raises the question of necessary adjustments to restore competitiveness of overvalued countries.
The balance of payment identity indicates that the current account is equal to the opposite
of the capital account. Countries which run a current account deficit have to borrow to the
rest of the world thus a current account deficit correspond to a capital account surplus. If a
country run large current account deficit on an extended period of time, the question of the
sustainability of its net external debt can be raised.
Even if the current euro area crisis was triggered by concerns on high levels of public debt, the
question of the sustainability of net external debts is a crucial issue since the deficit countries
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will have to run surpluses in the future in order to pay their current stock of external debt
in order to avoid Ponzi strategies. All measures of European policy makers are focused on
the competitiveness of (overvalued) countries which have problems to refinance their debts.
The aim is to restore competitiveness in order to allow these countries to run current account
surpluses (or at least, reduced current account deficit) to reduce the net external debt to GDP
ratio.
As argued by Belke and Dreger (2011), a reduction of unit labor cost (ULC) is on the top of the
agenda for overvalued countries. However, they propose (as a reduction of competitiveness for
surplus countries is not a feasible strategy) an asymmetric response through reduction of unit
labor cost only for Southern European countries in order to reduce imbalances inside the euro
area.
Such an asymmetric proposal raises two kinds of questions. Firstly, are the overvalued countries
able to restore their competitiveness only through reduction of ULC and such measures can
(alone) really achieve a reduction of current account imbalances inside the euro area? Secondly,
this kind of asymmetric proposal is a threat for economic growth of overvalued countries so we
can wonder if the total effect on the external debt to GDP ratio is positive since slower growth
tends to raise the external debt to GDP ratio.
As pointed out by Felipe and Kumar (2011), even a reduction of 20%-30% in nominal wage for
Southern European firms would not restore competitiveness relatively to German firms, since
the export basket is completely different and they would not be able to struggle with Chinese’s
wages in the export markets.
Since last ten years, the asymmetric evolution of misalignments in the euro area have reflected
diverging path in terms of competitiveness. These evolutions are one of the main underlying
causes of the current euro area crisis. In order to deal with these asymmetric evolutions, a
federal budget could help overvalued countries to switch to new activities and improve their
international specialization (Jeong et al., 2010; Duwicquet and Mazier, 2010).
In absence of coordination of national economic policies inside the euro area, the current euro
area crisis leads to pressures of financial markets on countries with deteriorated competitive-
ness and weak perspectives of growth. These pressures push these countries to accept austerity
plan to restore foreign investor confidence. A better macroeconomic management of the asym-
metric evolutions of competitiveness could be a more efficient way to restore confidence and
reduce imbalances inside the euro area.
2.4 Implicit transfers: Northern euro area versus Southern euro area
Exchange rate misalignments are meaningful at the intra-European level if we recognize the
existence of an equilibrium current account related to structural specificities of each member of
the Euro Area. This kind of concept has been considered in discussions on the extended stability
pact which includes other criteria than the public deficit and debt. Such hypothesis implies that
an exchange rate misalignment generates a gain or a loss in terms of cost competitiveness. In
a monetary union, an equivalent transfer associated to the exchange rate misalignment can be
computed. Two cases will be considered, the first one with only a bilateral exchange rate, the
second with a two countries euro zone facing the rest of the world. Empirical evaluation will
be given after.
2.4.1 The bilateral case
Such hypothesis implies that an ERM generates a gain or a loss in terms of price competitive-
ness. In monetary union, a transfer equivalent to the ERM can be computed. The ERM is
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expressed in deviation from equilibrium, we have:
Ep∗
p
= (1 + e) .
Eep
∗
p
(1)
with E, observed bilateral exchange rate3 , Ee, equilibrium bilateral nominal exchange rate, e,
bilateral misalignment, p, domestic prices, p∗, foreign prices.
As we can see in equation 1, in case of overvaluation (e < 0), we observe a lower price com-
petitiveness and in case of undervaluation (e > 0), we observe a higher price competitiveness.
The equivalent transfer T , associated to the ERM and which is, in fact, an additional unit cost,
positive or negative, can be obtained by equalizing the actual level of competitiveness and the
equilibrium level of competitiveness, corrected by the unit transfer T . We obtain:
Eep
∗
p
.
1
(1 + T )
=
Ep∗
p
= (1 + e) .
Eep
∗
p
(2)
T =
1
(1 + e)
− 1 (3)
In case of overvaluation (e < 0), we have a negative unit transfer which corresponds to an addi-
tional positive unit cost, the country transfer a part of its national income to the other countries.
In case of undervaluation (e > 0), we have a positive unit transfer which correspond to an ad-
ditional negative unit cost, this reduction of unit cost will enhance the external trade of the
country.
In case of overvaluation (e < 0), we have a positive unit transfer which corresponds to an addi-
tional positive unit cost. The country suffers of a loss of competitiveness. In case of undervalu-
ation (e > 0), we have a negative unit transfer which corresponds to a reduction of the unit cost.
This reduction improves the competitiveness of the country.
In level, ex ante, in a case of overvaluation, the transfers represent an additional cost for exports
(T .pX) and, in a symmetric way, an additional cost for local producers in competition with
imported products (T .pmM). For the overvalued country, the total transfer in percent of GDP is
equal to T .(pX+pmM)pY . In practice, an important share of imports corresponds to products which
are not in competition with domestic products (raw materials, goods not locally produced).
This share depends of the characteristics of the international specialization of each country. For
simplicity, we will suppose in the evaluation of these implicit transfers that only half of the
imports is in competition with domestic products. This will give a total transfer in percent of
GDP equal to T .(pX+0.5pmM)pY . It is worthwhile to notice that the total transfer is positive function
of the openness ratio. For the same misalignment, very open countries like Ireland will suffer
of higher negative transfer in case of overvaluation than less open countries like Greece or
Portugal.
2.4.2 The case of a two countries Eurozone
We consider now a euro zone with two countries North (N ) and South (S) and the rest of the
world (the USA to simplify).
1$ = Ee
3An increase of e corresponds to a bilateral nominal depreciation.
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The euro zone is supposed to be at its equilibrium parity, which is close to the observed facts
(E = Ee). On the opposite the two countries N and S are not at the equilibrium parity, the
country S euro is overvalued, the country N euro undervalued.
eN =
E −ENe
ENe
> 0 (undervaluation)
eS =
E −ESe
ESe
< 0 (overvaluation)
1$ = ENeeN = ESeeS
1eN =
ESe
ENe
eS (equilibrium exchange rate between €N and €S)
The overvaluation of the South is reflected in a real effective exchange rate inferior to its equi-
librium value, which means a reduced competitiveness.
(pUS .E)
αSUS .(pN )
αSN
pS
<
(pUS .ESe)
αSUS .(pNESe/ENe )
αSN
pS
(with, to simplify, αSUS = XS→USXS et αSN =
XS→N
XS )
For the estimation of the equivalent transfer associated to an overvalued South euro, we must
evaluate, as previously, the additional unit cost TS which is necessary to pass from the level
of competitiveness associated to the equilibrium exchange rate
(pUS .ESe)
αSUS .
(
pN ESe
ENe
)αSN
pS
to the ob-
served and less favorable level (pUS .E)
αSUS .(pN )
αSN
pS
. It gives:
(pUS .ESe)
αSUS .
(
pNESe
ENe
)αSN
pS (1 + TS )
=
(pUS .E)
αSUS .(pN )
αSN
pS
1 + TS =
(
ESe
E
)αSUS(ESe
E
)αSN(
ENe
E
)αSN = ESeE(ENe
E
)αSN
1 + TS =
(1 + eN )
αSN
(1 + eS )
With eN > 0 as the North euro is undervalued in relation with the dollar, eS < 0 as the South
euro is overvalued. TS is positive and corresponds to an additional unit cost associated to the
overvaluation of the South euro (1/1 + eS ), but also to the undervaluation of the North euro in
relation to the dollar (1 + eN )
αSN .
As previously, the equivalent transfer associated to an overvalued South euro can be computed
in % of GDP with:
• a transfer from the South to the North equal to T s.(pXS→N+0.5pmMS←N )pYS
• a transfer from the South to the rest of the world equal to T s.(pXS→US+0.5pmMS←US )pYS . (with
TS > 0)
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Symmetrically the equivalent transfer associated to an undervalued North euro can be com-
puted in the same way. The undervaluation of the North euro gives:
(pUS .E)
αNUS .(pS )
αNS
pN
>
(pUS .ENe)
αNUS .
(
pSENe
ESe
)αNS
pN
(with αNUS = XN→USXN et αNS =
XN→S
XN
)
(pUS .ENe)
αNUS .
(
pSENe
ESe
)αNS
pN (1 + TN )
=
(pUS .E)
αNUS .(pS )
αNS
pN
1 + TN =
(
ENe
E
)αNUS(ENe
E
)αNS(
ESe
E
)αNS =
(
ENe
E
)
(
ESe
E
)αNS
1 + TN =
(1 + eS )
αNS
(1 + eN )
With eS < 0 et eN > 0, TN is negative and represents a subvention received by the North, induced
by the undervaluation of the North euro in relation to the South euro (eN > 0), but also by the
overvaluation of the South euro in relation to the dollar (1 + eS )
αNS .
As previously, the equivalent transfer associated to an undervalued North euro can be com-
puted in % of GDP (TN < 0) with:
• a negative transfer from the North to the South equal to TN .(pXN→S+0.5pmMN←S )pYN , which
means a transfer in favor of the North equal to the opposite −TN .(pXN→S+0.5pmMN←S )pYN
• a negative transfer from North to the rest of the world equal to TN .(pXN→US+0.5pmMN←US )pYN ,
which means a positive transfer equal to the opposite −TN .(p XN→US+0.5pmMN←US )pYN
The rest of the world receives from the South T s.(pXS→US+0.5pmMS←US )pYS but gives to the North
−TN .(pXN→US+0.5pmMN←US )pYN . In the case of the relations between the Eurozone and the rest of
the world, the euro is close to its equilibrium parity. It means that the two previous transfers
balance each other. It looks as if the South was making a transfer to the rest of the world, which
was after repaid to the North by the rest of the world.
On the whole, due to the intra-European exchange rate misalignments, the South gives to the
North directly T s.(pXS→N+0.5pmMS←N )pYS and indirectly
T s.(pXS→US+0.5pmMS←US )
pYS
, which gives a total
amount of T s.(pXS+0.5pmMS )pYS . The result is the same as in the previous bilateral case, which is by
this way generalized.
2.4.3 Empirical evaluation of the implicit transfers between Southern and Northern Eu-
rope
For a misalignment of 10 %, the flow of income received by Northern euro area countries (Ger-
many, Finland, Austria and Netherlands) ranged between 3.8% and 9.4% (see table 10)4. We
4In table 10 and figure 3 the signs of the transfers have been inverted.
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observe similar values for Southern euro area countries (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, France, Italy
and Greece), the flow of income paid by these countries ranged between 2.5% and 14.2%.
In spite of relatively low openness ratio, Greece experienced an important overvaluation related
notably to an increase of its relative ULC. We compute the implicit transfers by summing on
the one hand, overvalued countries (Southern countries) and on the other hand, undervalued
countries (Northern countries). Since the introduction of the Euro, the implicit transfers within
the euro area have been favorable to Northern countries (see figure 3).
Table 10: Implicit transfers for a misalignment of 10 percent
Degree of opennessa Implicit transfers
MIN MAX MIN MAX
North Netherlands 71.3 103.3 6.5 9.4
Austria 52.7 76.9 4.8 7.0
Finland 42.1 60.5 3.8 5.5
Germany 41.6 60.0 3.8 5.5
South Greece 22.3 38.9 -2.5 -4.3
Italy 26.7 40.2 -3.0 -4.5
France 26.7 40.3 -3.0 -4.5
Spain 26.7 41.9 -3.0 -4.7
Portugal 29.8 48.9 -3.3 -5.4
Ireland 90.0 127.7 -10.0 -14.2
a Notes: Undervaluation for Northern countries and overvaluation for Southern countries. Openness ratios are
averaged over the period 2000-2011. Degree of openness MIN = XY ; Degree of openness MAX =
(X+0.5M)
Y .
Between 2000 and 2004, Southern countries was overvalued and transferred to the rest of the
world around 2% of their GDP each year. Received income by Northern countries amounted to
6% GDP on average over the same period. Since 2005, we observe a sharp increase of Southern
countries’ overvaluation which reached 25% in 2008. This inappropriate level of the euro have
had a strong impact on foreign trade since the equivalent transfer amounted to 9% of GDP in
the minimal case and 14% of GDP in the maximal case. During this period, we observe an in-
verse situation in the North: the flow of income extracted from the undervaluation increases to
reach an amount ranged between 7% and 10% of GDP in 2008. Since the opening of the crisis
in 2008 a reduction of these transfers has been observed, thanks to a decrease of the exchange
rate misalignments, partly induced by strong ULC adjustments in Ireland, Spain and Greece.
However Northern countries continued to receive important transfers (between 4% and 6% of
GDP) whereas Southern countries paid transfers of a similar amount (figure 2). With the aus-
terity plans implemented since 2010 in most of Southern countries, we observe a reduction of
current deficit (excepted in Greece) through recession or at least strong slowdown. As a result,
ERM and related transfers have been reduced. This situation of imbalances between Northern
and Southern countries related to structural heterogeneity in terms of competitiveness increase
the debt-to-GDP ratio of Southern countries without any implementation of stabilization mech-
anisms.
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Figure 3: Implicit transfers in percent of GDP for Southern and Northern euro area coun-
tries
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
NORTH Max SOUTH Min SOUTH Max NORTH Min
Source: authors’ calculations.
2.5 Transfers and fiscal insurance system
These implicit transfers due to exchange rates misalignments can be compared with the fiscal
insurance system proposed during the 1990s by the European Commission itself to compen-
sate the effects of asymmetric evolutions. To simplify, we retain the mechanism suggested by
Italianer and Pisani-Ferry (1992). In case of an increase of the rate of unemployment larger in
one country than in the rest of the Union, this country would benefit of a transfer provided by
the European budget. This transfer would be calculated according to the following rule:
Ti=0.01(dUi − dUiUE) ∗GDPi if 0 < dUi − dUiUE < 2 (4)
dUi =Ui (t)−Ui (t − 12)
with Ui , rate of unemployment in % of the country i, UiUE , rate of unemployment of the rest of
the EU.
The estimations calculated for the 1980s, with transfers limited to a maximum of 2% of the
GDP, gave an annual average cost for the European budget rather reduced (around 0.2% of
GDP). The estimations have been updated for the period 1996-2011. They give rather close
results: an average cost of 0.21% of GDP when the transfers are limited to 2% of GDP; 0.26%
of GDP without this ceiling when the fiscal insurance is applied to the members of the euro
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area; 0.26% and 0.28% of GDP (with or without ceiling) when this mechanism is supposed
to be enlarged to all the countries of the EU, including the United Kingdom. Table 11 gives
the results for the EU 27 without ceiling5. The transfers are, on average, more important for
the Southern European countries (Greece 0.75%, Portugal 0.71%, Spain 1.05%, Ireland 0.87%),
except for France and Italy, and for the Baltic countries. Germany also benefits (0.27% on
average, concentrated at the beginning of the 2000s). During some years transfers can reach a
significant level around 4 to 5% of GDP, when there is no ceiling.
Although proposed since long time, this fiscal insurance mechanism has never received very
favorable attention for two main reasons. First, its opponents consider this kind of transfer
encourages bad behavior, as, in case of higher unemployment, the rest of the EU will pay to
limit the negative effects. This argument cannot be ignored, but is not essential. Second, this
insurance mechanism could play permanently in favor of the same countries which suffer of
poor performances on the long run. Indeed it would be a mechanism of permanent transfer
and not an insurance mechanism. The argument is more important, but does not seem relevant
according to the observed results.
However this question is sensible in the context of the euro zone crisis where the Southern
countries are structurally affected by the overvaluation of their national euro and by problems
of competitiveness. In such a case, the cost can be high for the other countries of the euro area,
especially if there is no ceiling to the mechanism. According to estimations of the previous
table, transfers could have reached 3 to 5% of GDP in Greece, Spain and Ireland at the end of
the 2000s. These results are of the same magnitude as those obtained before with the implicit
transfers due to the overvaluation of the South national euro6. Indeed it could be logic that
the countries of the rest of the euro area support such transfers in order to avoid the South
European countries to be trapped in recession and zero growth during a long period. Overall,
this would help to preserve growth in the whole zone and to solve the public debt problems.
These transfers would be better suited than intra zone credits which are actually the only form
of help used in the euro area, except the partial cancellation of the Greek debt. These credits
give time and help to transfer problems in the future, but with a permanent debt burden.
However such transfer mechanism raises the problem of its duration and of its efficiency. Past
experiences, like the German reunification during the 1990s or the permanent transfers from
the North to the South of Italy, show that, if these transfers are a net gain for the beneficiary
regions, they are not sufficient to solve structural problems. These transfers must be completed
by more active policies in the fields of innovation, infrastructures and industries. The effect of
federal transfers will be examined now using a two countries SFC model of a monetary union
to have an assessment of their macroeconomic impact and their stabilizing role.
5 Other estimations are available with a ceiling and a limitation to the euro area. Results are always close.
6 With the exception of France and Portugal, highly penalized by the overvaluation of their national euro, but which
would only slightly benefit of the fiscal insurance mechanism as it is designed, due to the average evolution of their
unemployment rates, which raises the problem of the type of indicators to be used.
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Table 11: Estimation of transfer linked to fiscal insurance mechanism at the level of EU27
without ceiling in percent of GDP
T/GDPa AUT BEL CYP EST FIN FRA DEU GRC IRL
2001 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2002 0.30 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.30
2003 0.00 0.50 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.90 0.00 0.00
2004 0.50 0.10 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.60 0.70 0.00
2005 0.50 0.30 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.20 1.00 0.00 0.00
2006 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80
2007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.20
2008 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.80
2009 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.70
2010 0.00 0.00 0.20 2.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.40 1.10
2011 0.00 0.00 1.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.10 0.70
Average 0.14 0.14 0.32 0.88 0.00 0.08 0.27 0.75 0.87
T/GDP ITA LUX MLT NLD PRT SVK SVN SPN BGR
2001 0.00 0.00 1.10 0.00 0.30 0.70 0.00 0.00 3.30
2002 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.30 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00
2003 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.90 1.20 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00
2004 0.00 1.10 0.00 0.80 0.30 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
2005 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.40 1.30 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00
2006 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2008 0.70 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.10 0.00
2009 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.60 0.00 4.80 0.00
2010 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.70 1.70 0.70 1.40 2.70
2011 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.90 1.60 1.00
Average 0.06 0.38 0.14 0.23 0.71 0.32 0.20 1.05 0.64
T/GDP CZE DNK HUN LVA LTU POL ROU SWD GBR
2001 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.30 2.40 0.00 0.40 0.00
2002 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.40 0.60 0.00 0.00
2003 0.30 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.00
2004 0.40 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.10 0.70 0.00
2005 0.00 0.00 1.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.30
2006 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 1.30
2007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2008 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.60 1.60 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.40
2009 0.40 0.70 0.30 7.70 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.10
2010 0.00 0.80 0.50 0.90 3.40 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.00
2011 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.20
Average 0.10 0.24 0.34 0.93 1.03 0.42 0.24 0.22 0.21
a Source: Eurostat, ILO, authors’ calculations.
18
Ta
b
le
12
:B
al
an
ce
Sh
ee
t
H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
N
Fi
rm
s
N
St
at
e
N
B
an
ks
N
Fe
d
er
al
bu
d
ge
t
E
C
B
H
ou
se
ho
ld
s
S
Fi
rm
s
S
St
at
e
S
B
an
ks
S
C
ap
it
al
+
K
N
+
K
S
D
ep
os
it
s
+
B
D
N
−B
D
N
+
B
D
S
−B
D
S
C
u
rr
en
cy
+
H
N h
+
H
N
−H
+
H
S h
+
H
S
C
re
d
it
s
−L
N
+
L
N N
+
L
N S
+
L
S N
−L
S
+
L
S S
R
efi
na
nc
in
g
−R
F
N
+
R
F
N
+
R
F
S
−R
F
S
B
on
d
s
+
p
N b
.B
N N
−p
N b
.B
N
+
p
N b
.B
N S
+
p
N b
.B
S N
+
p
S b
.B
S S
−p
S b
.B
S
Eu
ro
bo
nd
s
+
B
T
E N
h
+
B
T
E N
b
−B
T
E
+
B
T
E S
h
+
B
T
E S
b
B
il
ls
−B
T
N
+
B
T
N N
+
B
T
N S
+
B
T
S N
−B
T
S
+
B
T
S S
E
qu
it
ie
s
−p
N e
.E
N
+
p
N e
.E
N hN
+
p
N e
.E
N eN
+
p
N e
.E
N hS
+
p
N e
.E
N eS
−p
S e
.E
S
+
p
S e
.E
S hN
+
p
S e
.E
S eN
+
p
S e
.E
S hS
+
p
S e
.E
S eS
W
ea
lt
h
−V
H
N
−V
N
−D
N
−V
B
N
−D
E
−V
H
S
−V
S
−D
S
−V
B
S
To
ta
l
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
19
3 A SFC model of two countries in a Monetary Union with fed-
eral budget or Eurobonds
A SFC model with two countries in monetary union allows a consistent description of assets and
liabilities and of all the associated real and financial flows. The monetary union is composed
of two countries (N and S) with an asymmetry of size. The country N is five times larger
than the country S. This configuration facilitates analyzing the adjustment mechanisms of the
country S facing the rest of the monetary union. We introduce federal budget with federal social
transfers, public federal expenditure and Eurobonds. This will allow studying the stabilising
effect of fiscal insurance system, as it has been proposed previously.
This model is inspired by Godley and Lavoie (2006, 2007), Lavoie (2003) and Duwicquet and
Mazier (2010). Firms accumulate both real and financial capital. They can finance their in-
vestments by undistributed profit, banking credit, or equities. We introduce two commercial
banks able to supplying credit and also, possibly, rationing credit. Households hold banking
deposits, bonds, and equities. We keep a similar representation of the central bank and the two
governments which issue bonds and treasury bills. Taxes on capital income (banks and firms
profit, households capital income) finance federal budget. Lastly, the model has been calibrated
to represent the structure of the European Monetary Union.
Table 12 describes the balance sheet in terms of assets (written with a positive sign) and liabi-
lities (written with a negative sign) of each sector: households, firms, government, commercial
banks, a single central bank and a federal budget. The transaction matrix, national accounts in
flows, is provided in appendix A. Beyond fixed capital (K), eight kinds of monetary or financial
assets are distinguished7: bank deposits (BD) held by households, bonds issued by governments
(pb.B) and held by households of both countries, loans (L) supplied by each commercial bank to
firms of the two countries, the equities issued by firms (pe.E) and held by households and firms
of both countries, treasury bills issued by each State (BT ) and held by commercial banks of
both countries, high powered money (H) held by households (Hh) as well as commercial banks
(reserve requirements), advances supplied by the ECB to commercial banks (RF) and finally
Eurobonds (BT E) issued by federal government and held by banks and households.
Households
Households exhibit traditional consumption behaviour with a wealth effect, taking into account
of capital gains on equities and bonds held. We specify a constant ratio of wealth to disposable
income in the long run. Households’ portfolio choice follows the approach developed by Godley
(1999) and Tobin (1969), with an arbitrage between cash (Hh), bank deposits (BD), bonds (pb.B),
equities (pe.Eh) and Eurobonds (BT
E
h ), depending on the relative rates of return of each asset:
rb for the interest rate on bonds of each country; id for the interest rate on bank deposits which
is the same in the two countries; ree for the rate of return on equities in each country and re
for the interest rate on Eurobonds. The cash demand follows a simple transaction demand of
money. The demand for bank deposits is not written and determined as a residual, using the
accounting equation of the households’ balance sheet. Households pay the taxes at the national
level (T ) and at the federal level (T Eh ). In addition, households receive social transfers: ST are
national social transfers and FT are federal transfers.
7 When there are two symbols (N and S), the subscript denotes the country where the asset is held, the superscript
the country where the asset is issued. For example, BT SN represents the bills held by country N and issued by the
country S.
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Households’ equations for country N
Consumption
CN=a0N+a1.YHSNh + a2.VH
N−1
(VHN = households’ wealth, YHSNh = disposable income with capital gains)
Disposable income
YDNh =W
N + id .BD
N−1 +BNN−1 +B
S
N−1 + re.BT
E
Nh−1 +DIV
N
hN +DIV
S
hN +ST
N −T N −CLN +FT N −T ENh
YHSNh = YD
N
h +CG
N
h
(YD = disposable income, W = compensation of employees, id .BD−1 = interests on bank de-
posits, BNN−1 and B
S
N−1 = interest on domestic and foreign bonds, re.BT
E
Nh−1 = interest on Eu-
robonds DIV NhN and DIV
S
hN = received dividends on domestic and foreign equities, ST = na-
tional social transfers, T= national taxes, CL = national social contributions, FT = Federal
transfers, T E = Federal taxes on capital incomes , CGh = households’ capital gains)
Taxes paid by households
T N = θN .WN
with θN = 12.5%
T ENh = θ
E
Nh.
(
BNN−1 +B
S
N−1 + id.BD
N−1 +DIV NhN +DIV
S
hN
)
with θENh = 10%
Social transfers and contributions
∆ST N = ∆T N +∆T Nf
CLN = τ.WN
with τ = 36%
Federal transfers
Federal transfers FT are entirely financed by federal taxes T E (taxes on households, firms,
banks and central bank) and represent 3% of euro area GDP.
FT = T E
The allocation of transfers between North and South is made according to GDP differences.
FT S =
1
5
.FT + β
 YNYNbaseline − Y
S
Y Sbaseline

FT N = FT −FT S
(FT S = Federal transfers received by South’s households, FT N = Federal transfers received by
North’s households)
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Households’ bonds demand
pNb .B
N
N
VHN
= v0 + v1.rNb − v2.rSb − v3.id − v4.rNee − v5.rSee − v6.re
pSb .B
S
N
VHN
= v0 + v1.rSb − v2.rNb − v3.id − v4.rNee − v5.rSee − v6.re
(pNb .B
N
N = government N bonds held by country N households, p
S
b .B
S
N = government S bonds
held by country N households, rb = interest rate on bonds, id = interest rate on bank deposits,
ree = rate of return on equities, re = interest rate on Eurobonds)
Households’ Eurobonds demand
BT ENh
VHN
= v0− v1.rNb − v2.rSb − v3.id − v4.rNee − v5.rSee + v6.re
(BT Eh = Eurobonds issued by federal government and held by households)
Households’ equities demand
pNe .E
N
hN
VHN
= v0− v1.rNb − v2.rSb − v3.id + v4.rNee − v5.rSee − v6.re
pSe .E
S
hN
VHN
= v0− v1. rNb − v2.rSb − v3.id − v4.rNee + v5.rSee − v6.re
(pNe .E
N
hN = equities issued by country N firms and held by country N households, p
S
e .E
S
hN =
equities issued by country S’s firms and held by country N households)
Cash demand
HNh = λ0.C
N
Households’ transaction equilibrium
∆BDN = YDNh −CN − pNb .∆BNN − pSb .∆BSN − pNe .∆ENhN − pSe .∆EShN −∆HNh −∆BT ENh
(BD = bank deposits)
Households’ balance sheet
VHN = BDN + pNb .B
N
N + p
S
b .B
S
N + p
N
e .E
N
hN + p
S
e .E
S
hN +H
N
h +BT
E
Nh
(VH= households’ net wealth)
Households’ capital gains on equities and bonds held
CGNh = ∆p
N
b .B
N
N−1 +∆p
S
b .B
S
N−1 +∆p
N
e .E
N
hN−1 +∆p
S
e .E
S
hN−1
This gives on the whole:
∆VHN = YDNh −CN +CGNh = households’ savings + capital gains = YHSNh −CN
Firms
Firms have both real and financial accumulation following a Post-Keynesian theoretical frame-
work (Clévenot et al., 2010). Their desired fixed investment (Id) depends positively on the
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profit rate
[
rf =
UP
K−1
]
and negatively on the debt structure
[
L
K−1
]
and the cost of credit (rl), with
a possible positive demand effect. Their financial accumulation, i.e. firms’ demand for equities
(pe.Ee), is mainly related to the rate of return on equities held (re) with an arbitrage between
domestic and foreign assets and a positive effect of the rate of profit reflecting the global envi-
ronment. Firms can finance their investments through undistributed profit (UP ), bank credit,
or by issuing equities. New equities issued by firms (pe.∆E) are determined as a percentage
of the total real and financial investment, with positive effects of both credit cost and the debt
ratio whose respective increases lead firms to issue more equities. The rate of return on equities
re is determined by dividends and capital gains. Lastly, income distribution is analyzed in a
simple way with a constant share of wages. Undistributed profit is determined by a constant
rate of saving by firms (sf ). Distributed dividends between shareholders (households and firms
of both countries) are related to the held equities structure.
Firms’ equations for country N
Fixed investment
IdN
KN−1
= k0N + k1.rf
N
−1 + k2.
∆YN
YN−1
− k3. L
N
KN−1
− k4.rl
(Id = desired investment, K = fixed capital stock, Y= GDP; rf = rate of profit =
UP
K−1 , UP =
undistributed profit, L = loans, rl = interest rate on loans)
Financial accumulation (firms’ equities demand)
pNe .E
N
eN(
KN+pNe .E
N
eN+p
S
e .E
S
eN
) = f 0 + f 1.rNe −f 2.rSe +f 3.rNf
pSe .E
S
eN(
KN+pNe .E
N
eN+p
S
e .E
S
eN
)= f 0 + f 1.rSe −f 2.rNe +f 3.rNf
(pNe .E
N
eN = equities issued by country N firms and held by country N firms, p
S
e .E
S
eN= equities
issued by country S firms and held by country N firms, KN+pNe .E
N
eN+p
S
e .E
S
eN = total real and
financial assets held by country N firms, pe= equities’ price, E = number of equities)
New equities issued
pNe .∆E
N(
IN + pNe .∆ENeN + p
S
e .∆E
S
eN
) = g1.rl + g2.( LN
LN + pNe .EN +V N
)
−1
+ g3
(pe.∆E = new issued equities, IN +pNe .∆E
N
eN +p
S
e .∆E
S
eN = real and financial investment,
L
L+pe .E+ V
= debt ratio in percentage of firms’ total liability, pe.E +V = firms’ own funds equal to issued
equities + firms’ net wealth)
Rate of return on equities
rNee =
(
EN−1. ∆pNe + DIV N
)(
pNe . EN
)
−1
=
∆pNe
pNe−1
+
DIV N
pNe . E
N−1
(E−1.∆pe = capital gains, DIV = distributed dividends)
Firms’ balance sheet
KN + pNe .E
N
eN + p
S
e .E
S
eN = L
N + pNe .E
N +V N
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Wages
WN = ρ.YN
(W = wages)
Distributed dividends
DIV N =
(
1− sf
)
.
(
YN−1 −WN−1 − rl.LN−2
)
Distribution of dividends
DIV NeN =DIV
N .
[
ENeN
EN
]
−1
DIV NhN =DIV
N .
ENhNEN

−1
DIV NeS =DIV
N .
ENeSEN

−1
DIV NhS =DIV
N .
ENhSEN

−1
(DIV NeN , DIV
N
hN , DIV
N
eS , DIV
N
hS = dividends of country N ’s firms distributed to country N and
S firms and households in relation with the number of equities held ENeN , E
N
hN , E
N
eS and E
N
hS ).
Taxes
T Nf = θ
N
f .
(
YN−1 −WN−1 − rl.LN−2 −DIV N +DIV NeN +DIV SeN
)
with θNf = 35%
T ENf = θ
E
Nf .
(
YN−1 −WN−1 − rl.LN−2 −DIV N +DIV NeN +DIV SeN
)
with θENf = 5.5%
(T = national taxes, T E = Federal taxes)
Undistributed profit
UP N =
(
YN −WN − rl.LN−1 −DIV N +DIV NeN +DIV SeN − T Nf − T ENf
)
Banks
Firms can get from banks all the credits demanded without restriction; credit demand is deter-
mined by the balance of the firms’ flow of funds. Investment is equal to the desired investment.
The share between domestic and foreign banks’ loans is simply related to the degree of openness
of the economy. Reserve requirements in high powered money represent a fixed share of bank
deposits and do not provide interest payments. A highly simplified treatment of interest rates is
retained. The interest rate on loans (rl) is presumed equal to the key interest rate of the central
bank (ib) plus a constant mark-up. To realize profits, banks apply a spread between the key rate
and the rate on deposits (id). The central bank provides advances (RF) to commercial banks to
allow the latter to provide the cash that households are asking for. These advances are made at
a rate of interest (ib) which is the key instrument of the monetary policy. They are determined
24
as banks’ balance. The central bank pays taxes, equal to its profit, which are shared between
the two national governments in relation with each country’s size.
Country N banks’ equations
Credit
∆LdN = IdN −UP N − pNe .∆EN + pNe .∆ENeN + pSe .∆ESeN
(∆Ld = credit demand)
∆LN = ∆LNN +∆L
N
S
LNS =
(
XN
YN
)
.LN
(LNS = credit supplied by country S banks to country N firms; L
N
N = credit supplied by country
N banks to country N firms, XY = openness ratio)
Reserves requirements
HN = ε.BDN
(H = reserve requirements in high powered money, BD = bank deposits)
Eurobonds
BT ENb = BT
E −BT ENh −BT ESh −BT ESb
(BT E = Total Eurobonds issued, BT Eb = Eurobonds purchased by banks, BT
E
h = Eurobonds pur-
chased by households)
Taxes paid by commercial banks to federal government
T ENb = θb.
(
rl .L
N
N−1 + rl .L
S
N−1 + r.BT
N
N−1 + r.BT
S
N−1 + re.BT
E
Nb − id .BDN−1 − ib.RFN−1
)
with θb = 18%
Banks’ profit
P BN = (1−θb) .
(
rl .L
N
N−1 + rl .L
S
N−1 + r.BT
N
N−1 + r.BT
S
N−1 + re.BT
E
Nb − id .BDN−1 − ib.RFN−1
)
Banks’ net wealth
∆VBN = P BN
Refinancing
∆RFN = ∆HN +∆LNN +∆L
S
N +∆BT
N
N +∆BT
S
N +∆BT
E
Nb −∆BDN − P BN
(RF= refinancing by the central bank, BT= Treasury bills purchased by commercial banks,
∆BT Eb = Eurobonds held by commercial banks, BD = bank deposits, P B = banks’ profit)
Central bank tax to federal budget
TeB = ib.
(
RFN−1 +RFS−1
)
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Central bank money
H =HNh +H
S
h +H
N +HS
Central bank equilibrium
∆H = ∆RFN +∆RFS
(This equation is derived from others in virtue of the Walras law)
Interest rates
rl = ib +m1b
id = ib −m2b
r = rl = r
N
b = r
S
b
re = r − 0.005
pNb =
1
rNb
(ib = key interest rate of the central bank, exogenous, rl = interest rate on loans, id = interest
rate on deposits, r = interest rate on Treasury bills, re = interest rate on Eurobonds, rb = interest
rate on bonds, pb = bonds price)
National government
Public finance is described in a simple way with exogenous expenditures and income taxes paid
by households and firms. Treasury bills are purchased by commercial banks without restriction,
with the distribution between foreign and domestic bills related to the openness ratio. Interest
rates on Treasury bills (r) and on bonds (rb) are supposed to be equal to interest rates on loans
(rl).
Country N government equations
Budget balance
∆BT N = GN + rn.BT
N−1 +BN−1 − T N − T Nf − pNb .∆BN + ST N −CLN
(BT= Treasury bills, G = public expenditures exogenous, T = income taxes on households, Tf
= income taxes on firms, r = interest rate on Treasury bills, B = interest on bonds, pb.∆B = new
bonds issued by government, ST = Social transfers, CL = Social contributions)
Treasury bills
∆BT N = ∆BT NN +∆BT
N
S
BT NS =
(
XN
YN
)
.BT N
(BT NS = countryN Treasury bills held by foreign commercial banks of country S, BT
N
N = country
N Treasury bills held by domestic banks)
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Bonds held by households
∆BN = ∆BNN +∆B
N
S
(BNS = country N bonds held by country S households)
Public debt
DN = −BT N − pNb .BN
On the whole we have:
VHN +V N +VHS +V S +DN +DS +DE +VBN +VBS = KN +KS
(Total net wealth at the level of the whole monetary union is equal to the total fixed capital; this
equation is derived from others)
Federal government
Federal taxes
T E = T ENh + T
E
Sh + T
E
Nf + T
E
Sf + T
E
Nb + T
E
Sb + TeB
(T ENh = Taxes paid by North’s households, T
E
Sh = Taxes paid by South’s households, T
E
Nf = Taxes
paid by North’s firms, T ESf = Taxes paid by South’s firms, T
E
Nb = Taxes paid by North’s banks, T
E
Sb
= Taxes paid by South’s banks, TeB = taxes paid by central bank)
Federal taxes represent 3% of Euro zone’s GDP.
YE = YN +Y S
(YE = Euro zone GDP, YN= North GDP, Y S= South GDP)
Eurobonds are issued to finance the deficit of the federal budget.
∆BT E = FT +GEN +GES + re.BT
E−1 − T E
(FT = Federal transfers, GEN = European investment in North, GES= European investment in
South, re.BT
E−1= federal debt service charges, T E= Federal taxes)
Distribution of federal debt between North and south depend on GDP share:
BT EN = BT
E .
(
YN
YN +Y S
)
(BT EN= Eurobonds held by North)
Foreign trade and current account
Foreign trade inside the monetary union depends only on the volume effect, since prices and
exchange rates are fixed. The current balance is composed of the trade balance, the balance of
capital incomes received and paid to the rest of the monetary union, and the exchanges inside
the banking system. Commercial banks pay interest to the central bank for their refinancing.
But the central bank pays taxes. In case of a deficit incurred by country N , the current balance
is financed through three channels: the holding of more assets of country N (bonds, treasury
bills, equities) by country S than the opposite (holding of assets of country S by country N ); the
channel of credit by banks of country S to firms of country N ; the refinancing by the central
bank which plays a key role as lender of last resort.
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Current account equations
Foreign trade
log
(
IMN
)
= µ0 +µ1n log
(
YN
)
XN = IMS
(IM = imports, X = exports)
Goods and services equilibrium
YN = CN + IN +GN +GEN +XN − IMN
On the whole, the model has 107 equations for 107 endogenous variables. GN , GS (public
expenditures) and ib (key interest rate fixed by the central bank) are exogenous.
Calibration
The model can be calibrated using balance sheets and national accounts in flows from Eurostat
for the European countries. Two sets of calibration have been used, the first one with an im-
portant share of equities (350% of GDP as in France in 2010) which reflects a high degree of
financialization. Dividends are larger than interest. The second calibration retains a smaller
share of equities (172% of GDP) and a greater role played by credit. The capital-income ratio
is also smaller (KY = 2 instead of 4), and equities are more held by firms than by households.
Lastly, the share of foreign dividends in the total dividends received is kept constant instead of
being determined by the structure of equities held. This assumption is more in line with the
relative weakness of the capital income received from abroad. Our second calibration can be
regarded as more realistic. However, the results of the two calibrations are rather close.
The elasticities in the equations are close to usual estimations. The basic scenarios follow a rate
of growth of GDP of 2% and a gross rate of accumulation of 7%.
4 Adjustments inside the monetary union
After the presentation of the model’s main characteristics, adjustment mechanisms facing sup-
ply or demand shocks can be analyzed. It allows a measure of stabilization coefficients, es-
pecially for federal budget and Eurobonds. Results are given with a simplified version of the
model where growth rates of equity prices are exogenous.
We present the model in five successive versions in order to identify the stabilization effects
specific to each factor:
• Model 1 contains neither federal budget nor Eurobonds;
• Model 2 includes a federal budget of approximately 3% of Eurozone’s GDP. This model is
divided into three sub-models depending on the parameter β of the following equation:
FT S =
1
5
.FT + β
 YNYNbaseline − Y
S
Y Sbaseline

– In model 2-a, β=0. In this case, adjustment is done simply by fiscal transfers. If the
small country (country S) is affected by a negative shock to its production, it will pay
less taxes and the rest of Euro zone (Country N) will pay more taxes;
– In model 2-b, β=50. The adjustment of the shock happens here by transfers from
country N to country S in addition to fiscal transfers;
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– In model 2-c, β=110. The extent of federal transfers is very high.
• Model 3 is without federal budget but with Eurobonds to finance projects of European
investment. Goods and services equilibrium is:
YN = CN + IN +GN +GEN +XN − IMN
Y S = CS + IS +GS +GES +XS − IMS
(GEN = European investment in North, GES = European investment in South)
European investments are entirely financed in this version by banks that are refinanced
with the central bank.
Simulations: loss of country S competitiveness due to exchange rate misalignments
We compare models 2 and 3 with model 1 (model without federal budget and Eurobonds).
In the foreign trade equations, we introduce an exogenous effect of higher unit labor costs in
southern countries relative to the North. The term T I is set at 0 in the baseline. For illustrate
the loss of country S competitiveness, the term T I is equal to 10 between periods 10 and 50.
log
(
IMN
)
= µ0n+µ1n. log
(
YN
)
+µ2.log
(
WN − T I
YN
)
−µ2.log
(
W S + T I
Y S
)
log
(
IMS
)
= µ0s+µ1s. log
(
Y S
)
+µ2.log
(
W S + T I
Y S
)
−µ2.log
(
WN − T I
YN
)
This shock deteriorates the current account of country S and improves North’s external trade.
Consequently, we observe a decline of the GDP in the South and an increase in the North. We
compare the effects of shock in the three model variants. The chart describes the relative change
in GDP of southern countries (cf. figure 4 and table 13).
Table 13: Stabilization coefficients in percent
t=0 t=3 t=10 t=30 t=40
Model 2-a 1.3 2.9 4.5 7.0 7.8
Model 2-b 32.5 42.5 48.8 52.9 51.7
Model 2-c 51.0 61.6 67.4 70.5 69.1
Model 3 30.3 41.9 47.5 55.3 53.6
Source: authors’ calculations.
Stabilization coefficients can be calculated by measuring the gap between financial autarky and
the other models. For the model 1, the relative decline of the GDP after the shock (at period
10) can be written at period 10: (Yn after the shock - Yn before the shock)Yn before the shock =-4.71%. For the model 2-b, we
get: (Yn after the shock - Yn before the shock)Yn before the shock =-3.18%. The gap between the two models is obtained by
the ratio of the relative decrease of GDP: 1−
[
Model 2b
Model 1
]
= 1− −3.18%−4.71% = 32.5%
Logically, the stabilization coefficient depends positively on the amount of federal transfers. In
model 2-a, stabilization is small in short term (2.9% in t=3). After the shock, country S pay less
taxes and country N pay more taxes. In model 2-b, stabilization is higher than model 2-a. After
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Figure 4: Effect of an overvaluation on GDP of country S GDP
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the shock, Southern countries receive transfers financed by the federal budget who represent
3% of Euro zone GDP. This amount is divided between the two countries according to their
different production change.
Figure 5: Evolution of national public debt in percent of GDP : baseline and scenario
(South’s overvaluation)
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The relative decline in GDP of the country S induces transfers from the North. Each year in
average, the country N transfers almost 0.4% of its GDP. In terms of country S GDP, transfers
represent almost 2% of GDP. This redistribution can stabilize around 40% of the shock in short
term and 52% in long term. In model 2-c, transfers from North to South represent in average
0.6% of country N GDP and 3% of country S GDP. Stabilization effects are more important:
51% in t=0 and 69% in t=40. In model 3, European investments are financed by Eurobonds.
Investment in percent of GDP represent in annual average 0.9% in two countries of Euro zone.
To counter the loss of competitiveness of South, large European projects are implemented. This
‘growth shock’ is mutually beneficial and the fasted growing can help southern countries. But
it is well known that such European investment projects are complex to implement, which can
reduce their macroeconomic impact. The establishment of a federal budget also has the ad-
vantage of limiting the rise in public debt of southern countries. The figure 5 highlights the
evolution of public debt in model 1 (without federal budget) and model 2-b (with federal bud-
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get but without Eurobonds). In the baseline, the public debt will tend to increase. In t=50,
public debt is around 80% in percent of GDP in South and 110% in North. In the scenario
(South’s overvaluation between periods 10 and 50), the public debt of Southern countries in-
creases further due to the loss of competitiveness which leads to a reduction of GDP growth.
But with a redistribution mechanism, GDP are less affected and the public debt increases less.
Without federal budget, the South public debt increased by 90 points of GDP over forty years.
Whereas its relative increase is 50 points with federal budget.
5 Conclusion
The euro zone crisis illustrates the insufficiency of adjustment mechanisms in a monetary union
characterized by a large heterogeneity. Exchange rate adjustments being impossible, they are
very few alternative mechanisms. Relative wage and price flexibility are proposed in order to
take place, at least partially. Actually these mechanisms are combined with fiscal restrictive
policy to reduce current and public imbalances. They allow only a very slow and partial return
to equilibrium with an important cost in terms of growth and employment and with large diffe-
rences between countries, due to strong structural specificities. They are more inefficient when
they are implemented simultaneously in interdependent countries, as it is presently the case in
the euro zone, especially in the Southern European countries. This situation reflects a simple
diagnosis. At the level of the whole euro zone current account is close to equilibrium and fiscal
deficit is smaller than in many other OECD countries. The euro is close to its equilibrium parity.
But intra-European imbalances are huge. The euro is strongly overvalued for Southern Euro-
pean countries, France included, and largely undervalued for Northern European countries,
especially Germany. We gave new estimation of these misalignments. Using panel econome-
tric techniques over the period 1994-2010, we confirmed that the exchange rate misalignments
in the euro zone have diverged, reflecting unsustainable evolutions. These exchange rate mis-
alignments block growth and induce fiscal and current deficits in the South while growth is
boosted in the North by exports, especially towards the rest of the euro zone, and deficits are
reduced. This situation is equivalent to implicit positive transfers in favour on the North and
negative transfers at the detriment of the South, which are largely ignored in the public debate.
We gave estimation of these implicit transfers and compared these results with the evaluation
of the system of fiscal insurance proposed by the Commission to fight asymmetric evolutions.
In a second step, we used a stock-flow consistent model of a monetary union with two countries
along the lines of Godley and Lavoie (2007). The model describes the real sector and assets and
liabilities of all the agents in order to analyze adjustment mechanisms and financial integration
in a consistent manner. A federal budget is introduced with federal expenditures and social
transfers financed by federal taxes and euro-bonds issuing. Three results were obtained. The
stabilizing role of such a federal budget is confirmed facing asymmetric shock, especially a loss
of competitiveness due to exchange rate misalignments inside the monetary union. Similarly,
the stabilizing role of euro-bonds used to finance European investment projects is illustrated.
Their role in the pooling of national debts would be the last point to examine.
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